Five Stars Only: The Underground Market for Fake Amazon and Google Reviews

In this report

Executive summary

How do consumers make choices online? The internet has long since exploded the number of available products and services, giving shoppers more choice than ever before. But that rise in choice has made guidance on purchase decisions a valuable commodity. Every day, consumers rely on the reviews and rankings of others to determine their purchasing decisions: a majority of Canadian consumers consult user-generated content, including reviews, as an essential step in their online shopping routines. More specific studies have found that reviews factor strongly into decisions for approximately 70% of consumers. The internet has birthed a thriving ecosystem of shoppers and experts offering in-depth advice for even the most esoteric of products. But something else has been growing on the underbelly of this ecosystem.

Digital platforms like Amazon and Google Maps have become polluted with fake reviews, thanks to black markets that operate in plain sight, often through other important digital platforms like Facebook. On these platforms, sellers and business owners can solicit fake five-star reviews in exchange for free products or commissions. Specialized fake review websites run similar fake review operations coordinating the actions of individuals or bots. Actors involved have developed sophisticated methods to evade detection by platforms—part of the reason why addressing fake reviews is challenging.

Fake reviews represent concrete harms for three distinct groups:

Consumers

For consumers, fake reviews obscure the true quality of a product or service, causing financial loss and decreasing the trust in reviews overall. In the most serious cases, fake reviews can lead consumers towards potentially dangerous products or services.

Honest sellers

For honest sellers, fake reviews purchased by their competitors put them at a clear disadvantage and obstruct them from competing on the basis of genuine quality. With no options for recourse, honest sellers are tempted to purchase fake reviews themselves.

Platforms

For platforms, fake reviews can lead to consumer distrust, and potentially open the door for legal liability.

The policies of the platforms involved explicitly prohibit fake reviews, but there are important gaps in their enforcement. The persistence of the issue raises serious questions about the role and incentives of the platforms: whether they have a financial interest in letting it persist, and whether gatekeeping behaviours create the conditions for the fake review market to thrive.

Across the world, regulators are noticing the harms that fake reviews represent and taking action. The UK’s Competition and Markets Authority has launched several investigations into some of the largest players. Canada’s Competition Bureau is investigating Amazon’s marketing practices relating to reviews and ratings and, according to the Bureau’s documents, is examining whether Amazon has a “business interest” in allowing fake reviews to remain on its platform. No finding has been made against Amazon and the investigation is ongoing.

The complexity of the fake reviews market, and the number of actors involved—many of which are outside Canada—make tackling the issue head-on difficult. Review brokers have kept up with increased efforts to detect fake reviews through increasingly sophisticated anti-detection strategies. While consumer education is a useful tool for many examples of online fraud, awareness campaigns have little effectiveness against fake reviews.

Despite these challenges, more can be done to address fake reviews, and for Canada, the Bureau’s investigation into Amazon is just the first step. Both regulators and the platforms themselves must be involved in a strategy to comprehensively tackle fake reviews:

Pillar 1

Requirements for review-hosting platforms:

Regulators must hold the platforms hosting fake reviews accountable for levying harsher penalties on actors involved in fraudulent activity. These penalties could include bans and suspensions, search result deprioritization for products, and consumer warnings, along with reporting and detection obligations placed on platforms. These requirements would ideally be prescribed via new federal anti-fraud legislation.

Pillar 2

Requirements for social media platforms:

Regulators must also hold social media platforms accountable for their role in supporting fake review networks. Requirements should include harsher penalties for the actors involved, stricter keyword search bans and better due diligence for ad customers.

Pillar 3

Alternative review systems:

Simultaneously, platforms should explore alternative review systems to address some of the underlying incentives for purchasing fake reviews, while also striving to better enforce their policies against fraud.

The problem of fake reviews undermines a key source of trust and transparency online and likely serves as a barrier to its further expansion. By building a more trustworthy online marketplace, policymakers and platforms can deliver benefits to consumers and businesses. Even the platforms themselves will reap the benefits of increased trustworthiness.

Introduction

As e-commerce becomes the default option for many consumers, the modern shopping experience has become increasingly overwhelming. Thousands of results can be generated in seconds, making it difficult to know what is trustworthy. This is where the helpful advice of other buyers who generously took the time to write reviews comes in. Online reviews help solve the information asymmetry of online shopping, making it much simpler to sort through an overwhelming list of options. The same can be said for physical businesses as much as e-commerce, where online reviews influence consumer choice and help narrow a long list of options.

For a majority of Canadian consumers, consulting user-generated content, including online reviews, is an essential step in online shopping.1 Other surveys have similarly found that reviews factor strongly into decisions for around 70% of consumers.2

Yet the high level of trust in online reviews is perhaps misplaced given online platforms have become increasingly littered with fake reviews. Sellers and businesses across e-commerce and review aggregating platforms have been accused of purchasing fake reviews from third parties to artificially inflate their ratings. From overseas Amazon vendors who solicit fake reviews from Facebook for their cheaply manufactured low-quality products to reported instances of Canadian professional practices paying for fake Google reviews to promote their businesses, fake five-star reviews seem to be everywhere. The practice, called review brokerage, persists despite attempts from platforms and regulators around the world to curb it. Fake reviews harm firms who attempt to compete on the basis of genuine reviews, and consumers who seek out genuine advice on their purchase decisions. They also have reputational implications for platforms that host reviews.

When it is possible to game the system, review brokerage represents a real threat to competition between firms. Firms who purchase fake reviews gain an unfair market advantage over their competitors by enjoying an inflation of their average ratings. This manipulation is problematic when ratings and reviews influence not only consumer decisions, but also how platforms make recommendations and present search results to consumers. At a moment when Buy Canadian sentiment is on the rise, these barriers to fair competition for honest Canadian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are especially important. Addressing the persistence of fake reviews across platforms is essential to maintaining competition on the basis of price and quality instead of fake review arms races.

Fake reviews have clear implications for consumers. Fake reviews deceive consumers as to the true nature or quality of a product or service, making it impossible to effectively compare alternatives. When consumers inadvertently purchase products because of fake reviews, they are likely to end up wasting their money or even being harmed by counterfeit or misrepresented products.

While both marketplace and social media platforms have taken action to limit fake reviews, the question of whether their business models and enforcement choices allow the problem to persist must be raised. Because Amazon is the dominant e-commerce platform in Canada, the persistence of fake reviews there leaves honest firms with few alternatives where they can compete fairly. As is the case with fraudulent online advertising, a dollar spent on a misrepresented product is still a dollar spent on the platform.3

The same logic extends to platforms like Google Maps, which shape the in-person purchase decisions of the majority of Canadians and therefore the fate of thousands of Canadian businesses.

Their ubiquity means that Google reviews are particularly well positioned to influence consumer choice, and thereby impact competition. If fake reviews are the norm, then they become a potent vector of competition. Accordingly, competition regulators around the world are taking action against fake reviews.

Canadian policymakers must step in to protect consumers and honest sellers on platforms if we want e-commerce to continue to thrive. In some ways the solution is simple: increasing the risks of purchasing fake reviews so that they outweigh the benefits for firms. But this is easier said than done. Reviews should represent an incentive for firms to compete on the basis of high-quality products and a chance to collect valuable feedback, not an easy opportunity for exploitation. With concerted effort from policymakers, this is possible.

What are fake reviews?

Reviews and ratings are often used interchangeably, though they represent two distinct elements of the ecosystem. Reviews are the text submitted by a consumer with a corresponding rating (most often out of five). Those ratings are then aggregated into a product or service’s overall rating. Ideally, a review represents the consumer’s genuine opinion, but often that is not the case.

Broadly speaking, a fake review is any review, positive or negative, that does not reflect the genuine opinion of its author. This definition encompasses many different types of review fraud, which contribute to an overall decline of the online shopping experience for consumers and competitors alike. While the focus here is review brokerage—when a firm solicits fake positive reviews from a third party in exchange for a free product or a commission—it is useful to define other relevant types of fake reviews.

Review bombing

When a product or service is inundated with negative reviews, typically for political or ideological motivations. Review bombing occurs across products and services, including film, gaming, literature and other industries.5 Review bombing can even take the form of extortion scams, where payments are demanded to remove the negative reviews.6

Astroturfing

When a business purchases or otherwise incites positive commercial representations online about its own product or service. Astroturfing does not necessarily happen through reviews, though they provide a useful vehicle for misleading representation, which is one key distinction from review brokerage. Astroturfing also often involves people affiliated with a business masquerading as genuine unbiased consumers in order to promote it.7

Suppression of negative reviews

When sellers delete or otherwise obscure negative reviews in order to give greater weight to positive ones. While there are technically no fake reviews written, it is still a deceptive tactic by which firms can game review systems in order to inflate their rankings. Firms can also effectively suppress negative reviews by making it difficult for consumers who had bad experiences to write a review in the first place.8

How does ‘review brokerage’ work?

Breaking down how review brokerage works reveals that fake reviews are highly accessible and fairly inexpensive, via numerous different pathways, for firms looking to exploit the system.

Review brokerage occurs on platforms where a firm is not directly responsible for aggregating the reviews it receives: on review aggregators or on e-commerce marketplaces. Review aggregators collect and host reviews externally to where the object of the review is being sold. Review collection is typically a core, if not sole, function of their business model: Goodreads or Letterboxd, for example. However, it is the platforms designed for reviewing brick-and-mortar service-based businesses—Google Maps, Yelp, Tripadvisor and even Facebook—that are the primary target for review brokerage. E-commerce marketplace platforms are responsible for managing the reviews for the third-party sellers they host. It is these third-party sellers who purchase brokered reviews to be inadvertently displayed by the marketplace owner—predominantly Amazon, but also others like eBay, Shopify or Walmart.

Sourced via
Facebook GroupsFake Review Websites
Fake Reviews
End up on
Third-party MarketplacesReview Aggregators
The review brokerage ecosystem

In both cases, because the firms operating on these platforms are not responsible themselves for hosting their reviews, review fraud needs to find a way to work inside the platform’s official channels: hence the emergence of review brokerage.

Review brokerage involves a sophisticated black market that often operates in plain sight across the internet. There are two main channels that support review brokerage: groups operating on social media platforms, mainly Facebook, and specialized fake review websites. The review brokers running these channels are the facilitators behind the whole review brokerage operation.

Facebook groups

Facebook groups are used to generate fake reviews for a range of platforms, including both e-commerce marketplaces and review aggregators, though the ones designed for Amazon reviews have received the most study. As many of these groups are public, it is easy to gain entry and the mechanics of how they work are well understood. Researchers from the University of California, Davis, Rajvardhan Oak and Zubair Shafiq, conducted surveys with the various actors involved in the practice.9 This network of actors has also been the subject of a comprehensive investigation by another group of researchers, Sherry He, Brett Hollenbeck and Davide Proserpio, who mapped the economic implications of fake reviews.10 Even earlier, reporter Zachary Crockett infiltrated several fake review Facebook groups and wrote about his findings in 2019.11 Using the Facebook-Amazon pipeline is therefore a useful starting point for understanding the dynamics of the fake review economy:

Step 1The product

Review brokerage begins with a third-party seller on Amazon interested in promoting a product. That seller can either then use a ‘review agent’ to find reviewers for the product, or, less commonly, find reviewers themself.12 To find reviewers, review brokers post products they need reviewed in a Facebook group and encourage anyone interested to reach out to get the products for free. Review brokers typically post many products at once for potential reviewers to browse through. Sellers organizing reviews themselves also post in these same groups to attract reviewers.

Facebook group search results for “Amazon reviewer”, listing groups such as Amazon Review Community, Amazon Reviewers Group, Amazon Canada reviewer group and Amazon reviews free products group.
Screenshot of Facebook group search results returned for “Amazon reviewer” search terms from a device in Canada. Not every group returned by such a search necessarily engages in review brokerage.

Fake review groups can be found incredibly easily on Facebook since most are named a variation of ‘Amazon Reviewers’. There are many groups listed exclusively for Amazon.ca and calling for Canadian reviewers only, confirming the existence of the issue in Canada. In their descriptions, the groups advertise to both sellers interested in boosting their rankings and to reviewers interested in receiving free products. Agents will also purchase targeted advertisements on Facebook to recruit reviewers.13 Upon joining some of these Facebook groups, review agents will also reach out to a potential reviewer directly.

A Facebook feed showing a review broker’s post of available products, including a grill, a portable cooler and a hair dryer, marked “Full refunds, CA available”. A callout reads: A post of available products from a review broker.

Step 2The review

Once a reviewer finds a product they are interested in, they reach out to the agent or seller to receive instructions for finding the product on Amazon through keyword searches. The reviewer then purchases the product on Amazon and, because they are a verified buyer, they are able to write the review. The review must be five stars, as implied by most of the descriptions for the Facebook groups that promise five-star reviews for the seller and confirmed in a conversation in which they asked an agent how the process works. It cannot include any disclosure that the review was written in exchange for a free product.14 Reviewers increasingly use AI to generate the review they post.15

Step 3The refund

Once the agent and seller have confirmed that a fake five-star review has been successfully written by the reviewer, the reviewer is refunded the cost of the product, typically via PayPal.16 Some 15% of products in these groups come with an additional commission for reviewers.17 Again, the essential difference between this process and review incentivization sanctioned by platforms is that receiving the refund is conditional on the reviews being five stars. Sellers will only refund reviewers once there is proof of a five-star review existing.

Facebook post titled “need review” promising the product for free plus an additional commission of 5 Canadian dollars.
Post from a review broker advertising an additional $5 commission for each review.
Facebook group description reading “Refund after order and commission after complete live review on Amazon”.
Instructions from a group stating the requirement that payment will only be sent after the review is live.

Facebook groups for other platforms

There is one key difference between how the market works for e-commerce platforms like Amazon and review aggregators: the lack of a product to order online means the incentive for reviewers needs to change. Seemingly, from various Facebook groups for Google reviews, reviewers are paid for each review they write instead of receiving a free product. In this scenario, there is no need for the cost of the product to be refunded to buyers, since they do not actually need to make a transaction in order to qualify for writing a review on Google.

Facebook post from a self-described professional review provider listing Google and Facebook review prices, from 1 review for $2 to 100 reviews for $180.
A post from a user claiming to be a “professional review provider” offering fake Google and Facebook reviews starting at $2 per review, with discounts for bulk orders.

There is also evidence of ‘review swap’ deals where businesses can exchange positive reviews with each other, presumably for free. Business owners will typically post their location, requesting review swaps in similar areas—likely this is to make the reviews look as organic as possible. Business owners also sometimes indicate the number of accounts they have (and therefore the number of fake reviews they can provide).

Three Facebook posts asking to swap reviews, from users in Canada, Calgary and Ontario.Facebook post reading “Looking for real swap in Toronto Please. I have 5 accounts. Please PM.”
Several posts from users looking for “review swaps”—often specifying locations

Fake review websites

Amazon has commenced civil proceedings against the operators of two websites that it alleges sell fake reviews: Skitsolutionbd.com and Amzreview.ca.18 Looking at these two websites provides an idea of how fake review websites operate, though this channel is more opaque than the Facebook groups by nature of the venue. Both websites were still up at the time of writing.

Amazon’s suit against the operators of Skitsolutionbd.com was filed jointly with the Better Business Bureau in the Superior Court of Washington for King County in October 2025 (Case No. 25-2-29591-5 SEA). The complaint pleads, among other things, tortious interference, and alleges that the defendant, whom it describes as the Bangladesh-based operator of the website, has been selling fraudulent reviews since March 2019.19

The Amzreview.ca suit was filed in June 2025 in the same court (Case No. 25-2-18887-6 SEA) against the as-yet unidentified operators of the website. Amazon alleges that they were running a fake review scheme with a network of over 8,000 reviewers worldwide and using methods to evade detection. That suit seeks damages and injunctive relief, also on tortious interference grounds.20 The allegations in both proceedings are Amazon’s and have not been tested in court.

Skitsolutionbd.com

Skitsolutionbd.com offers a suite of ‘marketing services’ for many different e-commerce platforms, including Amazon. Among these services are five-star reviews offered for sale, advertised as “real, legit and authentic reviews” and a “100% safe” way to increase sales. This offering itself has several five-star reviews, purportedly from Amazon sellers who praise the fast service and sales boost. One purchased five-star review ordinarily costs USD$35, but was marked down to USD$20 at the time of visiting in November 2025. The website also offered a bulk discount for orders over USD$1000 and promised a refund guarantee for “unsuccessful delivery”. Similar positive review services were listed for Facebook, Walmart, Etsy, eBay, AliExpress and Google.

The equivalent product for Google reviews was cheaper: discounted to USD$12 from an original USD$20. However, this is still not nearly as economical as the example from the Facebook group offering fake five-star Google reviews at a starting rate of $2 per review.

Skitsolutionbd.com product listing: Five Star Verified Google Reviews, Effective Way To Rank Business Page, discounted to $12.Skitsolutionbd.com product listing: Five Star Amazon Verified Reviews, Quick and Safe Way To Increase Sale, discounted to $20.
Positive reviews offered for sale on Skitsolutionbd.com for Google and Amazon.

The 89 reviews for this product were overwhelmingly positive, though it is difficult to trust their authenticity when the seller is quite literally in the business of selling reviews.

Five-star reviews from “verified owners” praising Skitsolutionbd.com’s Google review product.
Reviews for Skitsolutionbd.com’s verified five-star Google review product

Alternatively, the website offers a takedown service for negative reviews, ordinarily priced at USD$150, but marked down to USD$100, per review removed. Among its ‘online reputation management’ services, the website sells negative reviews for a seller’s competitors, advertised as the “[b]est way to defeat [an] opponent”, and for only USD$20 each. The product even explicitly promises to reduce a competitor’s rating and number of customers.

Skitsolutionbd.com product listing: Negative Google Verified Reviews, Best Way To Defeat Your Competitor, $20.Skitsolutionbd.com product listing: Amazon Negative Review Down Service, Keep The Reviews Far Away, $100.
Negative reviews offered for sale on Skitsolutionbd.com for Google and Amazon.

Amzreview.ca

The second website, Amzreview.ca, is similar, though it uses a Canadian (.ca) domain and is specific to Amazon. It offers five-star Amazon reviews in bulk, with a starting price of $15 per review, and claims to employ 4,500 Canadian reviewers. It clarifies that this price does not include the price of the product, which presumably goes towards refunding the reviewer. This suggests the process resembles the one used within the Facebook groups. For each of its packages, the website promises reviews containing both text and images from verified purchasers, with replacement guarantees in case Amazon takes down the review.

Amzreview.ca pricing table: 10 reviews for CA$150, 25 for CA$250, 50 for CA$400 and 100 for CA$700, each with verified purchase, replacement guarantee and text and image reviews.
Review packages offered for sale on Amzreview.ca.

Amzreview.ca describes its method as “risk free” and explicitly references Amazon’s sophisticated fake review detection algorithm. To avoid raising alarm bells, the website claims that it screens its reviewers thoroughly, including checking their review history and various demographic factors. Presumably, this screening process is intended to weed out reviewers that might present more suspicion for Amazon’s detection strategies.

Why do firms buy fake reviews?

While the motivation may seem obvious, it is worth briefly exploring the incentives for businesses to purchase fake reviews and the systems that shape those incentives. For businesses, the logic is simple: because high ratings and rankings have become a deciding factor in consumers’ purchasing decisions, fake positive reviews have a substantial potential to impact sales. Indeed, firms who purchase fake reviews on Amazon see a short-term boost in their weekly sales.21 Many of the Facebook groups and both websites even explicitly attract sellers or businesses with the promise of increased rankings and sales.

He, Hollenbeck and Proserpio’s work on the topic suggests that if a fake review is able to generate as little as one organic sale, it is worth the price for most of the firms purchasing them.22 Beyond that, when fake review websites guarantee to replace any reviews that are removed, it de-risks the purchase and makes fake reviews even more worthwhile. There is a powerful incentive to purchase fake reviews, especially when it is so easy for sellers and businesses to get away with it.

The benefit of fake positive reviews is compounded when reviews factor not only into consumer purchasing decisions but into how platforms display products and results from keyword searches. While these algorithms are largely unknown, it is understood that a large volume of positive reviews and high ratings are critical factors. He, Hollenbeck and Proserpio confirm that “products recruiting fake reviews improve their search position substantially” and that the impact is long-lasting.23 Reviews and rankings also often influence how platforms automatically present search results or award certain badges or labels to products, like “highly rated” or “best seller” labels that can further promote visibility, thereby creating an even stronger incentive for purchasing fake reviews.

Because positive reviews and a high rating are so powerful, not only as a mark of quality, but also to enable discoverability on platforms with huge volumes of competitors, the incentives for fake reviews are immense. The fact that e-commerce firms are largely at the mercy of the platforms when it comes to whether or not their products are seen by potential buyers makes fake reviews all the more tempting.

For physical businesses, reviews may be slightly less essential for swaying consumer choice. The discoverability of a physical business is not entirely dependent on how a platform like Google Maps displays search results. Consumers might stumble across a business’ physical presence without first consulting its virtual one. Still, the same incentives for purchasing fake reviews persist, and are likely to intensify as checking online reviews becomes a default step for more and more consumers.

Beyond the incentives, fake reviews are incredibly easy to acquire. In an experiment using a fake Facebook business profile, an investigation by the UK-based consumer advocacy group Which? found that hundreds of fake reviews can very easily be accumulated within a week.24 Posing as various businesses, Which? also found that review brokers make many assurances that the process is completely safe and that platforms rarely catch fake reviews.25 Even then, the consequences for getting caught purchasing or writing fake reviews are generally insubstantial. Powerful incentives for purchasing them, combined with their accessibility and relatively low risk, make fake reviews incredibly attractive.

Harms of review brokerage

Harms to consumers

Unsurprisingly, the statistics about the power of online reviews have troubling implications for the potential of fake reviews to sway consumer choice. Platforms also make it incredibly easy for reviews to have an influence on the consumer by awarding various ‘highly rated’ badges on the basis of reviews or ratings, or providing filters to sort products above a certain rating threshold. A behavioural study from Which? confirms that fake reviews are indeed highly effective at influencing consumer behaviour.26 Fake reviews encourage consumers to purchase lower-quality products or services and decrease trust in reviews more broadly. A working paper by researchers Gandhi, Hollenbeck and Li characterizes these impacts as misinformation, where consumers are deceived about the quality of a product, and mistrust, where overall consumer trust in reviews declines.27

For e-commerce products, fake reviews cause consumers to inadvertently buy a product of much lower quality than the fake, positive reviews would have led them to believe. In other words, fake reviews are a form of misinformation that leads consumers to vastly overestimate the true quality of a product.28 Crockett’s investigation anecdotally confirms this fact: when he plugged the charger he ordered from a seller advertising it in a fake review Facebook group into his phone, it immediately snapped.29

The harm is principally economic: consumers waste money on a product that does not live up to expectations, or may even be defective. When fake reviews mask the true quality, and therefore the value for the price of a product, they also make it difficult for consumers to comparison-shop effectively. Consumers are likely to miss out on products that would have offered them much better quality for the same price, or a slightly higher price. Fake reviews also raise the prices of the low-quality products they promote by requiring sellers to offset the price of the fake reviews themselves,30 and may even enable the sellers to further raise their prices to match their falsely inflated ratings.31

Quantifying the harms of fake reviews is more difficult than describing them. Estimates on the prevalence of fake reviews vary widely. One report from the UK government found that 11% to 15% of reviews for 3 common e-commerce products were fake,32 while a more extreme statistic suggests that up to 43% of reviews for Amazon’s bestsellers are “unreliable”.33 Tripadvisor’s own Transparency Report suggests that 8% of the reviews submitted to the platform in 2024 were fake, though these are just the ones successfully identified.34

For some products the risks of misinformation and deception are far greater. Many counterfeit and defective products are widely available on Amazon and potentially dangerous, like faulty oven mitts, electronics with fake certifications,36 or even counterfeit car seats that do not hold up in a crash.37 The harms of such products are only compounded by fake reviews that obfuscate their true quality, and mask the warnings contained in legitimate reviews.

It is worth acknowledging that most e-commerce platforms offer fairly lenient return policies, which helps address one of the potential harms of fake reviews. If a product does not live up to expectations, consumers can simply return it and get their money back. But in some cases, the low quality of a product might not become evident until after a few uses, once the return window has passed, or after harm has come to the consumer. In any case, considering the problem of fake reviews to be solved by return policies places an undue burden on consumers and maintains the erosion of trust in the online review ecosystem.

All fake reviews present the same general risk of deception, but there is one type of business for which the harms of fake reviews are inarguably the most pronounced: healthcare. In the UK, a warning was issued to consumers after a BBC investigation revealed that some medical clinics were using fake reviews to boost their Google profiles.38

Former federal investigator Kay Dean, who runs a YouTube channel called ‘Fake Review Watch,’ has documented numerous instances in which, on her analysis, medical clinics in North America appear to have received fake reviews, including a Toronto dental office39 and a Washington, D.C. laser eye surgery clinic.40 It is not difficult to imagine other businesses where fake reviews present greater risks due to the sensitivity of the services they deliver: say law firms, medical spas or psychologists41—all categories in which Dean has reported evidence of the use of fake reviews.

Where a regulated professional chooses to purchase fake reviews, it is legitimate to ask whether that willingness to mislead the public is confined to marketing. At a minimum, fake reviews deprive patients and clients of reliable information at the very moment they are choosing a provider, and may steer them toward a provider they would not otherwise have chosen, with consequences that can range from a poor outcome to serious harm. And unlike e-commerce products, medical procedures cannot simply be returned if they do not live up to the expectations set by fake reviews. This type of fake review is no longer a question of deceptive marketing, but one of serious public health and safety, and necessitates a dedicated response.

Harms to honest sellers

The impacts of fake reviews are also pronounced for the honest sellers who choose to compete fairly and forgo purchasing them. Firms who are directly competing with purchasers of fake reviews are unfairly disadvantaged, and all firms are indirectly harmed by decreased trust in reviews writ large.

It may be tempting to categorize fake reviews as a form of anti-competitive conduct by the firms who purchase them, but Sandeep Vaheesan’s framework of law-breaking as a method of unfair competition is more useful.42 Vaheesan posits that firms gain a “critical and illegitimate advantage over competitors” through law-breaking.43 That advantage can be financial or reputational, and enables them to steal sales and market share from their law-following competitors. Applied here, firms that purchase fake reviews are competing by breaking the rules—both platform policies and, in Canada, the deceptive marketing provisions of the Competition Act—to gain an advantage over the firms that abide by them.

By decreasing consumers’ trust in reviews more broadly, fake reviews harm all firms. Consumers will be less likely to trust reviews and ratings that are genuinely positive for honest firms, creating another barrier to fair competition.45 There is also a chance that decreased trust in reviews may require that honest sellers price their products or services more competitively in order to draw consumers in, since they can no longer rely on their high ratings to do so46. Thus, fake reviews provide a clear competitive advantage to the sellers that use them and disadvantage the honest sellers who do not.

When so many of their competitors are cheating and getting away with it, honest firms may feel they have no choice but to cheat as well in order to neutralize the unfair advantage earned by their competitors. This domino effect compounds the harmful impacts of fake reviews on consumers and makes clear why proper enforcement against fake reviews is essential. When a firm sees their law-breaking competitor fairly punished, it makes it less likely that they will engage in the law-breaking themselves.

Harms to platforms

The impact of fake reviews on consumer trust is also felt by the platforms that host them. Because fake reviews deceive and harm consumers, they have potential repercussions for the reputation of platforms.47 By factoring reviews and ratings into how they present search results or award certain badges, platforms inadvertently endorse products or businesses with high numbers of fake reviews. The platform’s endorsement of what the consumer then realizes is a low-quality product or service will reflect poorly on its reputation and trustworthiness.

A phone screen showing the Amazon Shopping app in an app store.

Potential legal liability is another harm vector for platforms. Given that fake reviews are prohibited under consumer protection or competition law in many jurisdictions, platforms with high volumes of fake reviews may be held legally responsible in some circumstances. Regulators in other jurisdictions have already taken enforcement action against platforms, and Canada’s Competition Bureau is investigating Amazon’s marketing practices relating to reviews and ratings under the Competition Act’s deceptive marketing provisions. Where fake reviews have more serious potential consequences, as in the case of medical clinic reviews, the legal liability or repercussions for platforms may be higher.

Fake reviews also create a burden of enforcement, though not an undue one, for platforms who must implement numerous detection mechanisms and removal strategies. For platforms like Amazon with lenient return policies, high concentrations of fake reviews might also mean they are processing greater volumes of returns as consumers send back products that do not live up to expectations. With these clear costs in mind, it is worth considering the incentive structures and platform policies that have nonetheless allowed for the proliferation of fake reviews.

What is already being done?

Though we may be at a high-tide moment for the prevalence of fake reviews, there are already efforts in motion to address this consumer protection crisis. A number of actors, including the platforms themselves, around the world have taken or proposed steps to rid the internet of fake reviews. Still, these efforts mark only the starting point, and Canada must do more.

By the platforms

Soliciting fake reviews is not permitted on e-commerce marketplaces. Amazon states in its ‘Anti-Manipulation Policy for Customer Reviews’ that “[a]ny attempt to manipulate reviews, including by directly or indirectly contributing false, misleading or inauthentic content, is strictly prohibited”.48 It recently reiterated that it has “zero tolerance for fake reviews”.49 eBay’s ‘Feedback Policy’ and Walmart’s ‘Ratings & Reviews Policy’ similarly ban fake reviews.50 Review aggregating platforms also ban fake reviews. On Google Maps, any form of rating manipulation is prohibited, including the solicitation of content that does not reflect a genuine opinion.51 There are equivalent bans on soliciting reviews in Tripadvisor’s ‘Content Integrity Policy’ and Yelp’s ‘Content Guidelines’.52

Like many of these platforms, Amazon uses a variety of methods, from AI-based detection tools to human investigators, to detect and remove fake reviews.53 Amazon has gone the furthest in its enforcement of its anti-review brokerage policy through legal recourse.

Its two lawsuits against the two fake review websites examined above are only the most recent examples; Amazon has a long history of legal action against Facebook group administrators or fake review brokers.54 According to an Amazon press release, it also previously obtained judgment against the operators of over 75 fake review websites and seller accounts, and it reports having deactivated over 150 such websites as of July 2025.55 Amazon also often reports the problematic Facebook groups to Meta. In a press release from 2022, it claims to have reported over 10,000 groups, which Meta reportedly took down more than half of.56

Other platforms have taken similar actions, including Trustpilot, which successfully sued two businesses that purchased and submitted fake reviews to its platform and obtained court orders to ban them from doing so.57 One of those businesses, particularly of note, was a dental practice which, according to Trustpilot, had received 1,868 reviews that Trustpilot determined to be fake.58 In 2024, Trustpilot reported removing 4.5 million fake reviews (7.4% of the total number of reviews submitted), 90% of which were removed automatically by its automated detection tools.59 Tripadvisor reports catching, blocking or removing 2.7 million fraudulent reviews in 2024 (a little over 8% of the total number of reviews they processed), though only 4.8% of those are what it terms “paid reviews”.60

Evidently, the platforms all maintain policies that prohibit fake reviews, and enforce them to a certain extent. The question is whether those policies and enforcement actions are sufficient given the scale and persistence of the problem.

In Canada

Thankfully, most forms of review fraud fall within the deceptive marketing provisions of Canada’s Competition Act. While they do not explicitly include fake reviews, those provisions in section 74.01 of the Competition Act state:

A Canadian flag hanging from a building.

A person engages in reviewable conduct who, for the purpose of promoting, directly or indirectly, the supply or use of a product or for the purpose of promoting, directly or indirectly, any business interest, by any means whatever, // (a) makes a representation to the public that is false or misleading in a material respect.61

Fake reviews fit into this framework as a false representation under the presumption that reviews are genuine expressions of the writer’s opinion and intended to promote a product or service. Two previous Competition Bureau investigations confirm the application of these provisions against various forms of fake reviews: an investigation against Bell, concluding in 2015, and one against a company called AmpMe, in 2023.

Bell was investigated by the Competition Bureau for astroturfing by encouraging its employees to post positive reviews about an app it was launching, MyBell Mobile, in app stores.62 The Bureau reached a consent agreement with Bell in 2015, which saw the company committing to a corporate compliance program and paying an administrative monetary penalty of $1,250,000.63 A consent agreement is registered with the Competition Tribunal and has the force of a court order, but it reflects a negotiated resolution rather than an adjudicated finding of liability. In this case, the agreement states that the Commissioner concluded that Bell’s actions met the elements of section 74.01 of the Competition Act.

More recently, the Competition Bureau investigated a Montreal-based company, AmpMe, which it concluded had purchased positive reviews from third parties for its mobile application.64 The Bureau stated that purchased reviews “created a false or misleading general impression among the public” and “influenced the application’s ranking and overall rating”. The Commissioner reached a consent agreement with the company in December 2023, similar to the Bell agreement, under which AmpMe agreed to pay an administrative monetary penalty without admitting liability.65 The Bureau’s position further clarifies that purchased reviews can be considered false or misleading simply on the basis of not being from genuine consumers.

While the above cases showed that the law applies to companies purchasing or producing fake reviews themselves, whether this liability under the Competition Act extends to platforms remains unclear. In conducting a deceptive marketing investigation of Amazon itself, the Competition Bureau is testing whether the e-commerce giant could be held liable for the fake reviews on its platform. This investigation began in late 2021, amidst rising consumer concerns over fake reviews.66

In June 2024, the Federal Court of Canada ordered Amazon to turn over records relevant to its investigation to the Bureau.67 A subsequent application by the Commissioner for additional transaction data was refused by the Federal Court, and that refusal was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal in March 2026.68 The Bureau has stated that the investigation remains ongoing. No finding of any contravention has been made against Amazon, and Amazon has not been found to have acted unlawfully.

According to Federal Court hearing transcripts, the investigation seeks to understand whether Amazon “has a business interest in turning a blind eye to Fake Reviews,” and “whether, given the economic consensus, Amazon has a financial interest to make or permit reviews.”69 The investigation is also concerned with how claims made by Amazon “may be influenced by reviews and ratings, a factor that could affect how products are ranked and displayed on their website and mobile app.”70 Those claims include a product’s overall star rating and badges awarded by Amazon, like the “Amazon’s Choice,” “Verified Purchase,” “Best Seller” and “Top Reviewer” badges.71

From the publicly available material, the question seemingly at the heart of the investigation is whether Amazon makes a false or misleading representation by using fake reviews in aggregating overall star ratings or in assigning badges, and whether it has a financial incentive to do so. If the Bureau’s theory were accepted, Amazon could in principle be found responsible for indirectly making a false or misleading representation available to the public. Though it is unclear at this time whether the case will find its way to Canada’s specialized competition court, the Competition Tribunal, its outcome will have important implications for the future of fake reviews on the largest e-commerce platform in Canada.

In other jurisdictions

A number of other jurisdictions have also taken action against fake reviews, including the U.S., the U.K., Italy, the E.U. and Australia. The U.K.’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has been particularly active against fake reviews over the past few years, launching inquiries into Amazon, Facebook, eBay and Google. The investigations, now concluded, have had similar outcomes.

In 2020, eBay and Facebook agreed to better address concerns about review brokerage.72 The CMA also alerted Facebook’s parent company, Meta, that fake reviews were being sold on its other platform, Instagram, and it agreed to investigate the issue. In 2021, after a follow-up investigation found that updated measures were ineffective at tackling review brokerage on both Facebook and Instagram, Meta again committed to strengthening them.73 The strengthened measures include suspensions or bans for users repeatedly creating Facebook groups or Instagram profiles for the purpose of review brokerage, and changes to search tools to make it more difficult to find these groups or profiles.

The flags of the European Union and the United Kingdom against a blue sky.

In January 2025, following the conclusion of the CMA’s investigation, Google committed to stricter measures for addressing fake reviews. Among these measures are prominent consumer warnings to be added to the profiles of businesses caught purchasing fake reviews and bans for reviewers frequently caught writing them.74 Most recently, in June 2025, Amazon came to its own agreement with the CMA. Amazon agreed to strengthen its enforcement against fake reviews, including via sanctions for sellers caught purchasing (or users caught writing) fake reviews.75 Bans are the only sanction mentioned, and only as a possibility.

Even earlier, in 2015, Australia’s Competition and Consumer Commission fined businesses for fake reviews posted on Google and YouTube,76 and Italy’s Competition Authority fined Tripadvisor for its claim that its reviews were “true and authentic”, despite the presence of numerous fake ones.77 This fine was subsequently annulled on appeal by the Regional Administrative Court of Lazio.78

From a legislative standpoint, many jurisdictions go further than Canada and explicitly prohibit fake reviews. Australia has several provisions that are analogous to Canada’s deceptive marketing provisions in its 2010 Competition and Consumer Act, but one key difference is its explicit ban on fake reviews. Section 29 of the Act makes it illegal to write a false testimonial—or a fake review.79 This provision has been successfully tried in several review fraud cases.80

Since then, the U.K. and E.U. have also taken legislative action. The U.K.’s recently enacted Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act explicitly includes fake reviews as a prohibited unfair commercial practice.81 Comparably, the E.U. Directive on better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules makes fake reviews illegal via a legislative amendment to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.82 Other jurisdictions have also taken a regulatory approach to fake reviews. Most notably, the U.S.’s Federal Trade Commission adopted a rule that prohibits the sale or purchase of fake reviews, both positive and negative.83 At the time of writing, the Italian parliament is also considering a law that would require anyone writing an online review to provide verifiable ID and proof that they had visited the establishment for which they are writing the review; require that reviews are posted within 15 days of a visit; and explicitly ban review brokerage.84 Fake reviews are already illegal in Italy but this draft law is intended to simplify enforcement.

The role and incentives of platforms

While all the platforms maintain their anti-fake review stances, the persistence of the problem despite their stated efforts to crack down on it raises legitimate questions about whether their incentives and enforcement choices allow it to continue. Might the platforms be partially responsible for creating the structures and incentives that enable review brokerage to thrive? Indeed, whether Amazon has a business interest in the persistence of fake reviews on its platform appears, from the Bureau’s court filings, to be a key question in the Competition Bureau’s ongoing investigation.

Here, it is worth taking a look at the largest and most dominant platforms in the fake review ecosystem: Amazon, Meta and Google.

Amazon

While helping to guide consumers, the badges that Amazon awards highly rated sellers and products also create incentives for purchasing fake reviews as a means of illicitly obtaining them. This is less a question of whether Amazon deliberately awards badges to sellers who purchase fake reviews, and more a question of its due diligence in making sure that it does not. By awarding badges, Amazon effectively certifies products with a mark of trustworthiness. If those products only merit badges because of fake reviews, Amazon indirectly enables fake reviews to reach and influence more consumers.

The available research suggests that Amazon’s efforts to deal with the problem of fake reviews fall well short of what its resources and capabilities would allow. He, Hollenbeck and Proserpio found that Amazon successfully deletes about half of fake reviews, but with an average lag of 100 days, meaning that sellers still benefit from the fake reviews before they are removed.85 Even then, the 50% deletion rate is less impressive considering that deleting the reviews is often the only penalty levied.

It also suggests that Amazon is underutilizing tools in its arsenal to regulate fake reviews more strictly. He, Hollenbeck and Proserpio do not find any examples of Amazon deleting products or banning sellers as a consequence for purchasing fake reviews, nor deranking them in search results. Instead, they observe that the positive impact fake reviews have on keyword ranking for products lasts for months, even after those reviews have been deleted.86

From the products investigated, Oak and Shafiq confirm that Amazon often deletes fake reviews, but that it only delists 20 of the 1,600 products whose sellers purchased them.87 There is more Amazon could be doing to disincentivize purchasing fake reviews, even without augmenting its detection capacity. These findings are difficult to reconcile with Amazon’s public statements about the rigour of its enforcement.

For Cory Doctorow, the underinvestment in anti-fraud detection mechanisms for fake reviews is deliberate on Amazon’s part:

But for Amazon, all of this is fine. This is how its system works, its flywheel. Amazon makes money when you are satisfied, and it makes money when you’re furious. The costs are borne by sellers, and by you. Why would the company invest in fighting fraud under those circumstances?88

Doctorow categorizes fake reviews as a symptom of “enshittification,” a process by which platforms extract value first from their users and then their business consumers, until everyone but the platform is worse off. Through this process, he argues, Amazon has extracted so much value from the good, honest sellers that it is now oversaturated with the bad actors purchasing fake reviews.89

A more troubling hypothesis is that Amazon benefits, at least in the short term, from fake reviews because they boost sales and rankings, and therefore has a weaker incentive to eliminate them.90 Yet there is no evidence that Amazon deliberately under-enforces its policies for this reason, and Amazon has consistently stated that it invests heavily in detecting and removing fake reviews.

Amazon suggests that, despite its own best efforts to crack down on fake reviews, the problem persists due to activity beyond its reach on social media platforms. Amazon attempts to shift some accountability towards social media companies, urging them to invest adequately in enforcement and detection in order to address the problem.91

Meta

As for how these reviewers become involved in the practice, Meta’s platform Facebook holds a degree of responsibility. Of the reviewers Oak and Shafiq interviewed, 75% reported being introduced to the fake review market through targeted advertisements on Facebook. These reviewers reported that Facebook’s advertising and recommendation systems surfaced fake review recruitment content to them, which suggests that those systems are capable of identifying users whose activity indicates an interest in such opportunities. Some reviewers stumbled upon the content simply by chance, without first searching for it.92

This finding suggests responsibility on Facebook’s part on two counts: for algorithmically prioritizing content related to fake reviews to users and allowing fake review brokers to purchase advertisements. The second count is more serious for Meta, since these advertisements promote a practice that is contrary to Meta’s own policies and to consumer protection law.

Two Facebook group searches side by side: “amazon review” returns no results, while “amz reviews” returns groups such as Amazon Reviewer Canada group, Uk Amazon Reviews and Amazon Reviews Italian.
Facebook group search results for different keyword variations relating to Amazon reviews. Not every group shown necessarily engages in review brokerage.

But Meta earns advertising revenue from such advertisements just as it does from legitimate ones. Indeed, internal documents from Meta reportedly projected that roughly 10% of the company’s 2024 revenue would come from advertisements for scams and banned goods—though Meta has characterized this figure as rough and overinclusive.93 This revenue distorts the incentives for Meta to completely shut down the fake review operations on its platforms, while the concentration of the online advertising market allows the biggest players to deliver enforcement against fraud that appears to be inadequate.94

Much like Amazon, Facebook’s seemingly lacklustre approach to enforcing its policies against fake review groups raises serious questions. Facebook’s main strategy is periodic removal of the groups, though they tend to reemerge quickly.95 It is unclear whether or not Facebook bans users associated with the groups, though that would be an appropriate consequence, especially for repeat offenders. Indeed, Facebook pledged to suspend or ban users who repeatedly create fake review groups in its 2021 commitments to the CMA, though there was no expectation that these changes would be made outside of the UK.96

Facebook has also implemented warnings on searches for keywords associated with review brokerage—likely due to its commitment to the CMA to make it more difficult to find fake review groups with its search tools97—but those have not been applied universally. A Which? investigation found that Facebook now prompts users who search for groups called ‘AMZ reviewers’ with a warning that the term is associated with fraudulent behaviour, but not for the spelled-out ‘Amazon reviewers’ version—a clear oversight in enforcement.98 Even then, a warning message does not seem like a sufficient step: fake reviewers already know that they are engaging in illegal behaviour99 and will not be dissuaded by such a message.

Interestingly, a Facebook search in January 2026 from a device in Canada for “amazon review” yielded no search results, with no warning message, but changing the search slightly to “amz reviews” yielded multiple groups whose names and descriptions indicate that they exist to recruit Amazon reviewers, targeted to users in Canada and other countries. Searches for “google reviews” quickly yielded similar results. Today it remains easy to find and join Facebook groups for the purpose of buying or soliciting, selling and writing fake reviews for numerous different countries and numerous different review-hosting platforms.

Google

Like Amazon’s, the volume of businesses on Google Maps creates a powerful incentive for purchasing fake reviews. Google’s “Local Guide” system awards points for each review written, eventually translating into different levels and badges.100 Similarly to Amazon, Google creates an unofficial certification system for reviewers, where reviewers with higher local guide levels are ostensibly more trustworthy.

Unfortunately, it can also falsely certify fake reviewers as trustworthy simply based on the volume of reviews they write. Indeed, there is evidence of these reviewers promoting their local guide status as a selling point, and consumer advocate Kay Dean has found instances of local guides writing fake reviews.101

Post in a “Google maps Reviews” Facebook group: “Need Google Map reviews that actually stay”, advertising Local Guide Level 8 accounts and up to 2,000 reviews a day.Post in a “Google maps Reviews” Facebook group advertising verified Local Guide accounts, localized IP matching and a lifetime replacement guarantee.
Posts in a Google fake review group advertising reviewers with local guide status, old accounts and English names.

These platform design elements do not deliberately incite fake reviews, and often are valuable to consumers, but they raise the due diligence expectations for a platform like Google.

Fake reviews on Google Maps present different detection challenges than those on Amazon. For one, Google does not have transaction data that it can use to legitimize a reviewer or glean other important information. However, Dean has persistently been able to track down fake Google reviews, and as she writes for the Toronto Star:

If a lone citizen investigator can ferret out a network involving over 1,200 businesses who are receiving fake reviews, certainly a multibillion-dollar tech company can do the same. Google’s negligence in allowing fake reviews to proliferate on its platform shows a disregard for the welfare of consumers and honest businesses.102

In her YouTube series, Dean looks at two key factors to determine whether a business has purchased fake reviews: (1) whether there has been a significant jump in the volume of reviews it has over the past few days and (2) whether its reviewers have significant overlap in the businesses they have reviewed. Often those businesses that several of the same reviewers have reviewed are in completely different parts of the world:

I plotted 30 of those supposed Toronto dental patients on a spreadsheet along with other businesses they had reviewed on Facebook. Twenty-four of those 30 patients had reviewed the same Florida dry cleaners. Eighteen had reviewed the same Texas locksmith. Fifteen had reviewed the same Maryland locksmith. Not believable.103

The process is straightforward, and one that Google should theoretically be able to replicate on a much larger scale with its advanced engineering capabilities. However, in some cases, it has been Dean’s own investigative process and findings that spurred further enforcement action by Google.104

Google does not receive a commission from the sales of the businesses that it directs consumers to, nor does it collect profits from fake review ads like Meta. Listing a business on Google Maps is free,105 which means Google does not have a direct financial incentive to leave up businesses that purchase fake reviews instead of suspending or barring them. Google’s incentive is to collect data on these businesses and in turn leverage that data to attract users to its platform. Whether or not as a result of this indirect relationship, the outcome appears to be that Google’s incentive to invest in proper enforcement against fake reviews is weaker than it could be.

Challenges of dealing with fake reviews

The role and incentives of platforms present one challenge to dealing with fake reviews. But there are several reasons why fake reviews are such a persistent issue across platforms and across jurisdictions.

There is little doubt that fake reviews can constitute reviewable conduct under the deceptive marketing provisions of the Competition Act—it is the assignment of liability that is challenging. More specifically, subsection 74.01(1) specifies that the person making the representation available to the public can do so “directly or indirectly”, which suggests that all parties, including sellers purchasing reviews, the reviewers, Amazon and Facebook, may all be liable. A press statement from the Competition Bureau interprets these provisions similarly: “anyone who writes or permits writing reviews that give a false or misleading impression to consumers could be liable”.106

Reviewers, review brokers and third-party sellers or businesses may be liable for directly making a false representation to the public by writing, brokering or paying for reviews, respectively. By displaying fake reviews, e-commerce platforms and review aggregators arguably make a false representation available indirectly. While the outcome is still uncertain, this view underpins the Bureau’s ongoing investigation into Amazon. By facilitating the review brokerage operation, platforms like Facebook indirectly allow a false representation to be made to the public.

The CMA’s investigation into Facebook suggests a similar position. The CMA, while clarifying that it does not allege Facebook intentionally allows fake reviews to be organized via its platform, still found “troubling evidence that there is a thriving marketplace for fake and misleading online reviews.”107 It was following this and subsequent investigations that Facebook made several commitments to the CMA to take further actions against fake review groups.108 The Competition Bureau has previously confirmed that firms purchasing fake reviews could be held liable through its agreement with AmpMe, though this liability was never established at the Tribunal.109 There are also notable differences between the AmpMe case and the review brokerage operations for large platforms. For AmpMe, it was a single firm purchasing fake reviews. If the Bureau were to go after firms purchasing fake reviews, even just on Amazon, it would involve an unwieldy number of individual firms, with separate investigations for each. These investigations would be highly resource-intensive and fail to address the problem on a platform-wide level.

The fact that many of these sellers are not based in Canada presents another challenge, since it would be difficult to enforce without adequate Know Your Customer (KYC) data. Targeting individual reviewers presents similar challenges related to legal jurisdiction and scale—effectively an endless whack-a-mole game as new reviewers pop up to replace ones that have been banned. Comparably, action against the platforms requires only a single investigation for each and, hopefully, can effect systemic change.

The Competition Bureau’s investigation into Amazon is an important first step towards addressing review brokerage, but it cannot be relied on alone. For one, the case of Amazon may not fit neatly into the legal test of the Competition Act, ostensibly legislation focused on competition rather than consumer protection. Whatever the outcome, there is also an extended timeline for any resolution to the matter. The investigation into Amazon has been underway since November 2021110—over four years in, there is no way of anticipating how much longer it may take. Using Cineplex as a comparable case, if the investigation were to proceed to the Competition Tribunal, it would be at least another year before a decision was reached, putting the timeline for resolution beyond the five-year mark.111

Even a favourable outcome would not necessarily alleviate the problem of review brokerage. The Competition Bureau has indicated particular interest in how Amazon makes representations—assigning “helpful votes, Amazon’s Choice badge, Verified Purchase badge, Best Seller badge, Top Reviewer badge and ranking, and Top reviews from Canada”—and how it displays search results on the basis of product reviews.112 It is possible that enforcement action against Amazon may only seek to restrict the basis on which Amazon can make such representations, which would not directly target the existence of fake reviews. Say, for example, Amazon could no longer use reviews and star ratings to award certain distinctions. Such an outcome would only address the issue that distinctions were being awarded unfairly and therefore deceiving consumers, but not the issue that fake reviews themselves can deceive consumers.

But a successful win at the Tribunal would establish the precedent that platforms can be held liable for fake reviews purchased by the third parties that they host. This would simplify future litigation and encourage better practices across the industry. Even then, individual cases would still need to be brought against individual platforms. This effect would be muted if the Bureau and Amazon were to settle and reach a consent agreement, with no firm precedent set.

An Amazon logo sign against a cloudy sky.

Detection of fake reviews

Review brokers always seem to be one step ahead of the platforms and find measures to circumvent new detection measures. As studies have found, these actors “are continuously improving and perfecting their manipulation strategies so that findings that were true only a few years ago, or strategies that could have worked in the past to eliminate fake reviews, might be outdated today.”113

Take the Facebook-Amazon example, where it was found that review brokers employ numerous anti-detection measures. On Facebook, brokers often deliberately misspell keywords such as ‘Amazon’, ‘refund’ or ‘review’ in their posts—often by swapping or omitting a single letter—to avoid automatically being flagged by Facebook. Brokers will also post their content through screenshots of text, rather than actual text to make it difficult for automated systems to detect keywords.114 Even when Facebook does detect and shut down these groups, they tend to reemerge under different names.115 The brokers will also sometimes proactively share backup contact information with reviewers to facilitate the creation of these new groups.116

Facebook group named “Amz trusted revie^wer network”, a private group with 13.3K members.Facebook group named “Riview Canadá Friend”, a public group with 173 members.
Two fake review groups with misspelled names—often a deliberate strategy to evade Facebook’s detection.

In the purchasing process, brokers provide reviewers with a number of strategies to make the purchase look as organic as possible. Brokers never provide reviewers with the direct product link to purchase the product, instead giving instructions to the reviewer on how to find it, since Amazon can easily detect purchases via product link and flag any subsequent reviews as suspicious.117 For similar reasons, brokers encourage reviewers to pretend to search through results before ‘finding’ the correct product and to wait at least 10 days before posting a review.118 These are also just the tactics that have been well observed: it is likely that review brokers and reviewers employ others as well.

A Facebook group post made of a screenshot of text: “Send me your Amazon link and paypal, my fiend. Please browse carefully for 2-3 minutes,” with redacted keywords and store name.
A Facebook group post—featuring a screenshot of text, rather than actual text—instructing reviewers to browse carefully for 2-3 minutes.

The sophistication of review brokerage’s anti-detection strategies is well demonstrated by Amazon and Facebook’s continual failure to successfully address the problem.

Detection of fake reviews on review aggregating platforms presents different challenges. Unlike marketplaces, review aggregators do not mediate the transaction between the seller and the consumer; instead transactions happen externally. For example, one might check Google reviews before visiting a new restaurant, but the meal would not be purchased through Google. This degree of separation means that the platform has less visibility into transactions, and therefore less information by which to legitimize reviews. For review brokers, it saves the work of having to make a transaction look authentic in the first place and makes detection even more challenging.

Review aggregators, however, can exploit a feature that e-commerce platforms cannot in detecting fake reviews. While Amazon’s products can reach consumers globally, there is a certain point where the geographical location of reviewers should cause suspicion for review aggregators. It is not plausible that the same set of reviewers scattered across the globe would all review the same set of equally spread-out businesses.

The limits of consumer awareness

Consumer awareness is sometimes proposed as a solution to fake reviews. The premise is that consumers that can better detect fake reviews will be less inclined to purchase from firms using them, which therefore makes fake reviews less effective at incentivizing organic sales. However, there is good reason to reject that premise given studies have shown that consumers cannot successfully detect fake reviews.

Not only might consumer awareness be an ineffective tool at addressing fake reviews, it may also be entirely counterproductive. One study reports that upon being informed about the existence of fake reviews, consumers actually became more suspicious of all reviews, despite not being any better at detecting them.121 Review brokerage thrives on the basis of incredibly realistic fake reviews that are expressly made difficult to detect. Increased suspicion of all reviews is potentially damaging, since if consumers perceive a review as fake when it is actually genuine, there are negative repercussions for firms with genuine reviews.122 Accordingly, there is a real concern that strategies to increase consumer awareness may inadvertently negatively impact all firms through misplaced distrust in all reviews.

Consumer awareness campaigns also place an undue burden on consumers for the detection of fake reviews. It should not be a consumer’s responsibility to detect the fake reviews that even the largest digital platforms like Amazon and Google, with all the many tools and resources at their disposal, struggle to remove.

Dealing with fake reviews

To improve on the current state and deliver better outcomes for consumers, there are several mechanisms that can curb the problem of review brokerage. Both platforms and regulators have a role to play as part of a comprehensive three-pronged strategy for tackling fake reviews.

The role of regulators is to hold the platforms that facilitate review brokerage accountable for punishing the actors involved. While the rationale is the same, different requirements are needed for review-hosting platforms than for social media platforms.

  • For review-hosting platforms, requirements should be focused on increasing the cost of purchasing or writing a fake review through harsher disciplinary action. This could involve mechanisms like the ‘name-and-shame’ model. Disciplinary action should also be proportionate to the harms, which means harsher punishments for self-regulated professionals purchasing fake reviews (Pillar 1).
  • For social media platforms, requirements should centre on better enforcement of policies against illegal activity and due diligence for ad customers (Pillar 2).

Simultaneously, platforms should explore alternative review systems to address some of the underlying incentives for purchasing fake reviews, while pursuing robust enforcement of their policies against fake reviews (Pillar 3).

Pillar 1 Requirements for review-hosting platforms

Platforms that host reviews need to be held to a higher standard, with a focus on proportionate disciplinary action, due diligence to consumers, and transparency. Only these platforms have the information and visibility required to properly enforce policies against fake reviews. They also have the immense technical knowledge and capability to detect fake reviews and discipline the perpetrators.

Rather than accepting the excuse that there is nothing further they can do on the problem of fake reviews, consumers and policymakers alike must hold the platforms accountable. For Amazon in particular, it is difficult to square its inability to stem the tide of fake reviews with the apparent rarity, based on the available research, of sanctions against sellers the platform itself has identified as using fake reviews, or against the consumers writing them. Amazon’s legal action against the organizers behind the fake reviews is welcome but the same stance should characterize its enforcement against fake reviews in its own walled garden.

If the Bureau concludes its ongoing investigation into Amazon via a consent agreement, it could impose stricter requirements for dealing with fake reviews there. However, these requirements would then only be narrowly applicable to Amazon and would fail to address fake reviews more broadly.

To effect systemic change, regulators should require platforms that host reviews to more adequately ensure that they are trustworthy. These requirements could find a home within provincial consumer protection frameworks, but ideally would be included inside a new comprehensive piece of anti-fraud legislation at the federal level, as CAMP has previously proposed.123 The goal of this legislation would be to hold digital platforms accountable for enforcing policies against fraud and certain deceptive practices.

Increased disciplinary action

For review-hosting platforms, the primary aim is to increase the severity of penalties levied on actors involved in review brokerage. The evidence suggests that while platforms like Amazon and Google do successfully detect a substantial portion of fraudulent review activity, they underutilize a number of tools at their disposal. Currently, platforms seem to rely heavily on the deletion of fake reviews as a sole penalty, which has evidently failed to provide enough of a disincentive for firms to continue purchasing them. With harsher punishments for firms caught purchasing fake reviews, the opportunity cost of a fake review increases, with the potential to change the underlying incentives for participants.

Anti-fraud legislation could prescribe a number of different appropriate penalties for platforms to employ, including suspensions, lifetime bans for repeat offenders, public consumer warnings (‘name-and-shame’), fines, or search ranking deprioritization. In particular, platforms should be required to reverse any positive impact that fake reviews caused on a product’s visibility in search results, so the firm at the very least does not continue to benefit from fake reviews once they have been detected and removed.124

The legislation could include provisions about adequate detection of fraudulent activity on platforms, with penalties for non-compliance if certain targets are not met. Stricter requirements for due diligence could apply for products and firms that a platform endorses through its own badges, labels or otherwise promotes. Platforms should also be required to monitor banned or suspended actors to ensure they cannot easily create new accounts. Still, adequate detection of fake reviews means little if the actors involved are not being adequately punished.

Another component should be reporting obligations for platforms: the information about actors involved in the fake review networks generated through increased detection and enforcement activity would be compiled into a bad actors registry, shared across review-hosting platforms. Often, these actors are not operating on only a single platform, so the registry could support efforts to streamline detection across platforms. Such intelligence sharing enables platforms and regulators to better collaborate in tackling online fraud.125

Name-and-shame

The ‘name-and-shame’ model is a disciplinary mechanism by which consumer warnings are prominently displayed on the pages of firms caught purchasing fake reviews or reviewers caught writing them. It was included as part of Google’s commitments to the CMA,126 and though its effectiveness has not yet been tested there, it is an example worth exploring.

Consumers are less likely to purchase from firms with such warnings, which sways the cost-benefit analysis for firms purchasing fake reviews in the first place.127 The implications are similar for reviewers: if a reviewer’s profile is branded with a clear warning for consumers, any review they write will immediately raise suspicion. Transparency-based mechanisms also increase consumer trust more broadly by demonstrating that a platform takes fraud seriously—more than simply deleting fraudulent activity does.128

Some platforms already use name-and-shame mechanisms. For example, Yelp uses both Compensated Activity Alerts, for businesses Yelp has found to have offered compensation for reviews, and Suspicious Review Activity alerts, for businesses suspected of fraud.129

Yelp “Compensated Activity Alert”: We caught someone offering up payment in the form of cash, discounts, gift certificates or other incentives in exchange for someone to write, change, prevent or remove reviews for this business.
Screenshot from a business on Yelp flagged with a Compensated Activity Alert.

Whether or not a name-and-shame penalty is prescribed by anti-fraud legislation, it is one that platforms should seriously consider as part of their enforcement strategy against fake reviews.

Addressing the serious harms of fake reviews in self-regulated professions

Canada has the clearest incentive to act where fake reviews present the greatest harm: namely, when fake reviews are used in self-regulated professions. When licensed and accredited professionals like dentists, psychologists or lawyers purchase fake reviews for their businesses, the harms to consumers are potentially more severe than for other fake reviews. There is also a much higher expectation of conduct from these professions, which demands harsh punishments when violated. While the consequences of a defective product can be serious, deception here represents a breach of the trust underlying the concept of self-regulation and creates the potential for serious physical and legal consequences for misled Canadians.

The bodies that regulate the professions and are responsible for licensing and accreditation, like Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario130 or the Law Society of Ontario,131 will need to be part of the solution. These bodies have the responsibility of determining whether or not a professional can be trusted by Canadians, and regulating their respective fields in the public interest. The Law Society of Ontario explicitly states that it regulates lawyers and paralegals “in the public interest by ensuring that the people of Ontario are served by lawyers and paralegals who meet high standards of learning, competence and professional conduct.”132

When a professional violates the mark of trustworthiness conveyed by a licence or accreditation, it is a serious concern for these bodies. It calls into question their reputation and erodes the trust of the public they are meant to protect. Fake reviews are the very opposite of the high standards of professionalism they are tasked with maintaining.

While some discretion for disciplinary action may be left to these bodies, immediate revocation of the right to practise is the correct remedy to assertively prevent the use of fake reviews by self-regulated professionals. As for all types of fake reviews, the key is to make the risks of purchasing them outweigh the benefits. For these professionals, the potential profit or reputation boost achieved from fake reviews is far outweighed by the potential loss of livelihood and reputational damage of a licence suspension.

To empower licensing and accreditation bodies to make such decisions through a proper investigation, they need access to information. Even where fake reviews are suspected, it is difficult to access adequate proof without the information at the disposal of the platform hosting the reviews.

Therefore, platforms should have an obligation to report any documented instances of regulated or accredited professionals in Canada purchasing fake reviews to the respective regulatory body. Ideally, this obligation would be achieved under the anti-fraud legislation, and then could feed into the information registry.

This obligation would likely be felt most acutely by Google Maps, where there are several examples of dentists, psychologists and lawyers allegedly purchasing fake reviews in Canada. Yet when a platform functions partly as a tool to connect people with these professionals and reviews effectively provide an informal verification service, that platform must have some responsibility to its users.

Pillar 2 Requirements for social media platforms

The social media channels supporting the fake review networks must be addressed as part of a comprehensive and robust strategy against review brokerage. Meta is the primary and obvious target given the role its platforms play in hosting, and through advertising and amplifying, review brokerage activity.

On platforms like Facebook, identifying the source of the fake reviews is incredibly straightforward, intentionally so to drive reviewer and business traffic. Therefore, detection of fake review activity on social media is often relatively easier than on review-hosting platforms, where the actors have evolved sophisticated anti-detection techniques. Limiting the volume of fake reviews that can be successfully brokered by making it more challenging for actors to organize will also reduce the enforcement burden down the line.

A phone home screen with a folder labelled Social Media containing social app icons.

The CMA’s multiple investigations of Facebook highlight the importance of considering where fake reviews are sourced, but also suggest an opportunity for Canada’s Competition Bureau. Under similar logic as Amazon, the Bureau could launch a parallel investigation into whether Facebook has a business interest in letting fake review activity continue on its platform and whether it could be liable for making false representations available under section 74.01.

Taking a more systemic approach, stricter requirements could be imposed on social media platforms via the comprehensive anti-fraud legislation. These requirements should include bans or suspensions for accounts associated with review brokerage, and bans on keyword searches and misspelled variations of these keywords. For example, the fact that searches on Facebook for “Amz reviews” still return groups that, by their own descriptions, exist to recruit paid reviewers seems like an evident gap in enforcement.

“Know-your-customer” rules should also be imposed to address advertisements associated with review brokerage. These rules require an entity to verify or even validate the identity of a customer, and, as CAMP has previously argued, could be applied to digital advertisement publishers as a proactive approach to ad fraud.133 In the context of fake reviews, the “know-your-customer” principle would require Meta to deny any advertisements that promote review brokerage in its verification process, before it even runs the ads. Tackling these scam ads hamstrings the ability of review agents to lure potential reviewers into their groups, helping cut down the volume of reviewers involved in the first place.

Actors may ultimately adapt to other channels to organize themselves—especially given the high degree of resilience they have so far displayed—but tackling social media platforms enhances the robustness of the strategy to address fake reviews. Considering only review-hosting platforms, or only social media platforms for that matter, would neglect several opportunities for intervention in the lifecycle of a fake review.

Pillar 3 Alternative review structures for platforms

While platforms would ideally adopt many of the requirements presented above in an effort to better enforce their own policies against fake reviews, they also ought to fundamentally reconsider how review systems are designed.

Taking the time to write genuine reviews for products and businesses is a fundamentally generous act, especially as consumers are growing increasingly fatigued by demands for feedback.134 In an ideal world, reviews operate as a sort of pay-it-forward model: a consumer writes reviews for the products they purchase and can depend on reviews from other legitimate consumers when they make their next purchase. Unfortunately, the generosity of this crowd-sourcing model has been co-opted by bad actors.

Legitimate review incentivization strategies, which provide free or discounted products and services in exchange for honest reviews, are one way to compensate reviewers for the time they spend writing reviews. Review incentivization also supports the interests of firms by allowing them to access a high volume of reviews, especially as they are just starting up. The necessity of reviews for visibility in a crowded online marketplace creates a barrier to entry for firms looking to compete on the basis of good-quality products. A legitimate channel for accessing reviews gives them a chance to answer that need without being tempted by fake reviews. However, for firms that use fake reviews to mask the true low quality of a product, review incentivization will not do much.

Many platforms like Amazon and Yelp already have review incentivization strategies in place, so here it would be a question of expanding their scope and ensuring that they are broadly accessible. For review incentivization strategies to be successful, the reviews must also be trusted by consumers. Non-negotiably, there must never be any expectation that a review is positive within review incentivization programs and it must always be transparently flagged as an incentivized review.

Amazon’s guidelines actually previously allowed sellers to offer free or discounted products in exchange for honest feedback. However, because those reviews were often biased in favour of the product and then became widely distrusted by consumers, Amazon ultimately changed the guidelines to only allow review incentivization through the official Vine Program.135 Part of the bias may have been subconscious: a reviewer receives a product for free or heavily discounted, and therefore automatically has a more favourable opinion of the seller, or is less critical in assessing value for money. Alternatively, sellers might have been deliberately searching out reviewers who were less critical, and reviewers might have deliberately inflated their ratings to continue being selected for such opportunities.136

Either way, it becomes clear that review incentivization programs must instruct reviewers to be entirely truthful in their opinions and as objective as possible, and should assure them that providing negative ratings or reviews will not compromise their eligibility. There must be clear guidelines and safeguards for sellers to ensure that reviewers do not feel pressured to provide positive feedback. If anything, reviewers in incentivization programs who exclusively provide positive reviews and five-star ratings must be looked on with suspicion.

Taking the recruitment of reviewers seriously can also help promote trust. Canadian Tire’s TESTED for Life program, for example, vets potential reviewers to ensure they will provide genuine and accurate reviews, and matches them with products they are most interested in.137

Furthermore, it is essential that review incentivization programs are delivered officially and in a coordinated way by the platform. Individual sellers should not be left to select their own reviewers and organize the provision of incentives themselves, as Amazon discovered.

Ultimately, platforms should not seek to substitute proper enforcement action on fake reviews with review incentivization strategies. Such strategies are instead intended as a supplement to designing better and more trustworthy review ecosystems that recognize the essential contributions of consumers and the interests of firms.

Conclusion

The appropriation of consumer reviews by bad actors is not something that should be accepted as inevitable. It is possible to maintain a higher degree of integrity for reviews, and that starts by holding the platforms that host them accountable. While these review-hosting giants—many of the same platforms that already command so much control over the digital economy—assure consumers that they are doing everything within their power to combat fake reviews, the evidence reviewed suggests otherwise. Regardless of whether or not these platforms derive any benefit from the presence of fake reviews, their persistent failure to enforce their own policies against fake reviews effectively reflects an apparent lack of diligence.

Beyond fake reviews, platforms like Amazon and Google already make it difficult for firms to compete on multiple grounds. Addressing some of their gatekeeping tactics could promote an environment where firms do not need to turn to fake reviews to begin with. And reining in the market power that enables them to get away with inadequate enforcement is part of the solution to addressing fake reviews, as well as so many other issues.

The current “Buy Canadian” movement is an excellent reminder of how far consumers are willing to go to support certain firms with their hard-earned dollars. Fake reviews pose a direct threat to consumer choice by eroding the ability of consumers to support firms they feel are deserving. Reinstating the integrity of reviews restores power to consumer choice.

A note on methodology and sources

Evidence in this paper was collected intermittently from January 2025 to January 2026 from Facebook groups and from two specialized review websites identified by Amazon.

I found Facebook groups through Facebook’s own search tools with keywords like “reviews” or “reviewers” and the name of the platform or retailer I was interested in (Amazon or Google). I identified groups that were designed to broker inauthentic reviews based on their descriptions, which normally contained some variation of the instruction that any review must be five stars only.

Evidence was collected from Facebook groups open to the public, with the exception of a few large private groups that quickly accepted a request to join without a vetting process. Many review agents also reached out to me directly after joining groups to offer additional products and encouraged interested reviewers to reach out with questions. Two excerpts from conversations with review agents were included in the paper. All profile names, shop links and product information have been redacted to maintain the anonymity of those involved.

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  127. Noorie Malik, “Yelp publishes an index of Compensated and Suspicious Activity Consumer Alerts recipients and releases survey findings on what makes reviews trustworthy,” Yelp Blog, September 20, 2023. https://blog.yelp.com/news/yelp-publishes-index-of-consumer-alerts-recipients-releases-survey-findings/; Ananthakrishnan, Li and Smith, “A Tangled Web.”
  128. Uttara M. Ananthakrishnan, Beibei Li and Michael D. Smith, “A Tangled Web: Should Online Review Portals Display Fraudulent Reviews?,” Information Systems Research 31, no. 3 (2020): 950–971, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48759146.
  129. Malik, “Index of Compensated and Suspicious Activity Consumer Alerts recipients.”
  130. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, “About,” accessed March 14, 2026, https://www.rcdso.org/about-rcdso.
  131. Law Society of Ontario, “About,” accessed March 14, 2026, https://lso.ca/about-lso.
  132. Law Society of Ontario, “About.”
  133. Canadian Anti-Monopoly Project, “World of Scams,” 28.
  134. James Douberk, “Every business wants your review. What’s with the feedback frenzy?,” NPR, February 26, 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/02/26/nx-s1-5685107/online-review-survey-feedback-fatigue-amazon-shopping.
  135. Sarah Perez, “Amazon bans incentivized reviews tied to free or discounted products,” TechCrunch, October 3, 2016, https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/03/amazon-bans-incentivized-reviews-tied-to-free-or-discounted-products/.
  136. Perez, “Amazon bans incentivized reviews.”
  137. Mary Teresa Bitti, “Building Consumer Confidence in Online Reviews,” The National Post, July 30, 2018, https://nationalpost.com/sponsored/life-sponsored/building-consumer-confidence-in-online-reviews.

About us

Emily Osborne

Author

Emily is a Fellow at the Canadian Anti-Monopoly Project and a Policy Researcher at the Canadian Shield Institute, where her work focuses on digital sovereignty and technology governance. Her commentary has appeared in venues like the Globe and Mail, Tech Policy Press, the Financial Post and the Walrus. Emily holds a Master of Public Policy and a Bachelor of Arts and Science, both from McMaster University.

Keldon Bester

Editor

Keldon Bester is the Executive Director of CAMP, and a Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI). Keldon has worked as a Special Advisor at the Competition Bureau, and as a Fellow at the Open Markets Institute.

About CAMP

CAMP is a think tank dedicated to addressing the issue of monopoly in Canada. We produce research, policy, and commentary in support of a more free, fair and democratic economy.

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Five Stars Only: The Underground Market for Fake Reviews Online


The Paramount-Warner Bros merger is done. Here's how it could affect Canadians

CBC

Skydance-owned Paramount has completed its $81 billion US takeover of Warner Bros. Discovery, further concentrating an already consolidated entertainment industry. CAMP Executive Director Keldon Bester told CBC the merger could mean fewer films, greater reliance on blockbuster productions and tougher competition for Canadian production work as the combined company looks to cut costs.

Read the article here

Nortera-B&G Canada backing down from takeover is a win for competition and food affordability

October 6, 2026 [Ottawa, ON] – The Canadian Anti-Monopoly Project (CAMP) welcomes the decision by Nortera Foods and B&G Foods Canada not to proceed with Nortera’s proposed acquisition of Green Giant and Le Sieur brands, a deal the Competition Bureau said would likely reduce competition in the supply of canned and frozen vegetables. 

The Bureau challenged the proposed acquisition in August, alleging that it would eliminate a major national competitor in markets where Nortera already holds a dominant position. Its investigation concluded the deal was likely to lead to higher prices and fewer choices in the grocery aisle for Canadians when they need it most. 

“It’s good to see the Competition Bureau’s more assertive enforcement stance begin to pay off,” said Keldon Bester, Executive Director of the Canadian Anti-Monopoly Project. “The Bureau was right to challenge a merger that would have put Green Giant and Le Sieur under the same umbrella as one of their competitors. With the deal off the table, retailers and shoppers will keep another option in a market where affordability matters and choice is already limited.” 

The outcome follows the Bureau’s successful request for an injunction from the Competition Tribunal to block the transaction while the merger case was heard. This is an early sign that Canada’s reformed merger enforcement regime is able to address harmful consolidation before a deal closes and the loss of a competitor becomes harder to reverse. 

“Preventing this merger from going ahead keeps the market from getting worse, but it does not fix the concentration that is already there,” Bester said. “Canned and frozen food production remains highly consolidated. If we want competition and choice to improve, we need to think bigger than stopping individual deals.” 

Competition among food producers and suppliers shapes the prices and choices available to retailers and, ultimately, consumers. Effective merger enforcement is an essential defence against further concentration. To improve competition, Canada needs to go on the offence and address the conditions that make food markets difficult for new and growing competitors to enter and expand. 

 


Strengthening the Safe Social Media Act

Strengthening the Safe Social Media Act | CAMP
In this report

As introduced, the Safe Social Media Act has the potential to make Canadians safer online by creating reasonable duties and obligations for important online platforms. As it stands, however, the scope of the Safe Social Media Act misses a key opportunity to protect Canadians from a driving source of economic harm online: frauds and scams.

With the right reforms, the Safe Social Media Act could be a winning formula for protecting Canadians online. Expanding its scope to address fraud and scams, strengthening accountability for the businesses and technologies that enable them, and making compliance workable for smaller platforms would help the Act deliver on that promise. CAMP proposes four changes:

The Safe Social Media Act provides a long awaited and necessary step toward the regulation of these online platforms. The Act’s combination of duties of care, reporting requirements, researcher access and the creation of an empowered regulator are a winning formula to building and maintaining a safer online environment for all Canadians.

But the Act can be made stronger, and better fit to purpose by expanding protections for consumers and for competition. No case makes this clearer than the epidemic of frauds and scams on social media, impacting tens of thousands of Canadians and causing hundreds of millions in losses every year. Seniors are especially vulnerable to online scams, representing 40% of reported losses in 2024. Online fraud is a growing problem for all Canadians, with younger Canadians now the most likely to fall victim to scams.i

~75%of cyber-enabled fraud in Canada came from social media and online sources
$357Min cyber-enabled fraud losses in 2024
15Bpotentially fraudulent ads served per day on Meta’s platforms
10%of Meta’s annual ad revenue estimated to come from potential scam ads

Social media platforms and other online sources accounted for the majority of scam losses in Canada in 2024, and account for nearly 75% of cyber-enabled fraud, over $357 million.ii

Advertisements on social media play a major role in distributing scams; in 2024, Meta’s internal estimations suggested their platforms served up to 15 billion potentially fraudulent advertisements per day. As advertisements are paid content, the incentives to address them outside of regulatory pressure are weakened: reporting found that Meta estimated that potential scam ads constituted up to 10% of its annual ad revenue, and the accounts behind these ads were allowed to accrue dozens of strikes before review, if any action was taken at all.iii Other jurisdictions, like Australia, have enacted comprehensive anti-scam legislation that makes online platforms and other actors responsible for eliminating scams, and to be transparent about how they do it. UK regulators have included scams as harmful content under the Online Safety Act.

To protect all Canadians from the most proliferate online harms of our day, frauds and scams must be included as harmful content. Excluding frauds and scams from the Act leaves vulnerable Canadians like seniors, youth, and newcomers at risk of extortion and financial ruin.

Canada’s regulatory approach must not entrench the positions of firms that resist regulation and stifle innovation at home. To protect competition and the possibility of new products and services entering the Canadian market, obligations must be proportional to the role of the platform without entrenching dominant players, and resources must be available across the market. This includes technologies developed for safety and compliance.

SECTION 1

Making social media safer for all Canadians

01 Add frauds and scams to the definition of harmful content

As well as offering a model for online safety legislation, the United Kingdom and Australia are also leading the way in combatting scams and fraud. The Office of Communications in the UK has proposed regulations to cover fraud and scams under the Online Safety Act, imposing duties to act against scam accounts, remove fraud advertisements, and verify advertisers.iv Similarly, Australia’s Scams Prevention Framework regulates social media platforms by imposing a duty to protect users, report their efforts, and creating a compliance regime.v The Safe Social Media Act has all the necessary components to be an effective anti-scam bill, with some adjustments.

CAMP Recommendations

  • Include frauds and scams as a category of harmful content in the Act
  • Ensure duties for regulated platforms to review and remove reported harmful content include scam and fraud content and advertisements

02 Regulate business models that incentivize harmful scam content and the actors behind it

While online platforms are quick to make public statements about cracking down on scam activity, investigations and research have revealed a different picture. Platforms can be slow or unwilling to take down content and crack down on accounts that are significant revenue sources, removing offending content while leaving accounts free to continue operating. In large part, this is because the advertising-based business model that many scammers exploit to target victims means that scammers are consistent sources of revenue. Allowing online platforms to self-regulate and selectively report allows them to hedge their financial gains from scams against the costs of regulatory compliance. Regulators and researchers need the tools to set clear requirements for conduct, verify measures are effective, and act when they are not.vi

CAMP Recommendations

  • Clarify language around platform purpose in 8(a) so that advertisements and paid content on regulated social media platforms and online services are covered by proposed duties of care
  • Include regulatory guidance covering advertising and sponsored content within the remit of the Digital Safety Commission, including advertiser verification, and guidelines for advertising of financial products and investment opportunities
  • Strengthen platform reporting requirements on harmful content to include:
    • Action at the account level, rather than individual content
    • Information about how potentially fraudulent content is reviewed and handled
    • Revenue generated from removed or flagged harmful content and accounts
    • Verified account transfers and approval processes to prevent scammers from laundering accounts
  • Include retention requirements for advertising content that includes all versions of ad copy for flagged and removed advertisements as well as account information

03 Acknowledge the role of AI models and their owners in labelling and safety requirements

AI generated content is increasingly used by scammers to impersonate public figures, and to spread other harmful content. To effectively deal with the proliferation of artificial intelligence tools for generating synthetic content and its effects on social media and discourse, the Act’s labelling obligations must apply to all actors involved. The responsibility for labelling synthetic content should start with the generator of the content, and extend to the distributor, as the European Union has done with its Code of Practice on Transparency of AI-Generated Content.vii If labelling of synthetic content is uniquely the responsibility of online platforms, it may become a resource-intensive content review requirement that is difficult to meet for all but the biggest firms.

CAMP Recommendations

  • Extend synthetic content labelling requirements to regulated chatbot operators
  • Ensure that compliance measures developed by model owners are available to commercial license holders and operators of those models
SECTION 2

Protect competition and alternatives for Canadians

04 Make compliance resources and technologies available across the market

Compliance with the Safe Social Media Act will incur technology and administrative costs on regulated providers, including developing digital safety plans, employing resource persons, creating content retention strategies and even age verification. The largest platforms in the market will have the advantage and initiative when it comes to developing technologies and standards that influence compliance standards. To avoid entrenching the market power of dominant platforms and Canada’s dependence on US tech companies, smaller platforms must be able to grow without being hindered by a compliance regime built for companies that are already massive.

CAMP Recommendations

  • Require regulated platforms to release documentation on systems implemented for the purpose of C-34 compliance and develop a resource collection that makes processes and technologies used for compliance available across the market
  • Develop and promote open standards and whitelisted technologies that lower barriers to compliance, such as secure data retention and content flagging and review systems

CONCLUSION

Protecting Canadians online starts with a comprehensive understanding of how and why harmful content proliferates online. A definition of harmful content that reflects all the types of harms that Canadians experience online must include scams in order to be effective.

NOTES

References

  1. Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre (CAFC). 2024 Annual Statistical Report. Annual Report. Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre, 2025. https://opencanada.blob.core.windows.net/opengovprod/resources/1ffc4a5e-e41b-48c7-929e-633d023ef8dc/cafc-annual-stats-report-2024-en.pdf?se=2026-07-01T15%3A11%3A15Z&sp=r&sv=2024-08-04&sr=b&sig=3XRgDn4iM78OI%2BigygXiBF81lIkEuuq4W3S1%2B5wWOcc%3D.
  2. CAFC, 2024 Annual Statistical Report.
  3. Jeff Horwitz. “Meta Is Earning a Fortune on a Deluge of Fraudulent Ads, Documents Sh….” Reuters, November 20, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/investigations/meta-is-earning-fortune-deluge-fraudulent-ads-documents-show-2025-11-06/; Jeff Horwitz and Angel Au-Yeung. “Meta Battles an ‘Epidemic of Scams’ as Criminals Flood Instagram and Facebook.” Wall Street Journal, May 15, 2025. https://www.wsj.com/tech/meta-fraud-facebook-instagram-813363c8; Jeff Horwitz and Engen Tham. “Meta Tolerates Rampant Ad Fraud from China to Safeguard Billions in Revenue.” Investigations. Reuters, December 15, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/investigations/meta-tolerates-rampant-ad-fraud-china-safeguard-billions-revenue-2025-12-15/.
  4. Ofcom. “Big Tech Must Tackle Scourge of Scam Adverts, Says Ofcom.” Www.Ofcom.Org.Uk, United Kingdom, July 10, 2026. https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/online-fraud/big-tech-must-tackle-scourge-of-scam-adverts-says-ofcom; YouGov and Ofcom. Online Paid-for Advertisements Research Report. United Kingdom, 2026. https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/research-and-data/online-advertising/online-paid-for-advertisements-research-report.pdf?v=422394.
  5. The Treasury, Australian Government. “Scams Prevention Framework – Protecting Australians from Scams.” Gov.Au, 2025. https://treasury.gov.au/publication/p2025-623966.
  6. Chris Fox. “Facebook and Google ‘Failed to Remove Scam Adverts.’” Future. BBC News, April 26, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-56888693; Jeff Horwitz. “Meta Is Earning a fortune.”; Jeff Horwitz and Angel Au-Yeung. “Meta Battles an ‘Epidemic of Scams’.” https://www.wsj.com/tech/meta-fraud-facebook-instagram-813363c8; Jeff Horwitz and Engen Tham. “Meta Tolerates Rampant Ad Fraud.”; Tech Transparency Project. Meta Awash in Deepfake Scam Ads. Tech Transparency Project, n.d. Accessed October 1, 2025. https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/articles/meta-awash-in-deepfake-scam-ads.
  7. European Commission. “Code of Practice on Transparency of AI-Generated Content.” European Commission, July 31, 2026. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-ai-generated-content.
ABOUT CAMP

The Canadian Anti-Monopoly Project (CAMP) is a think tank dedicated to addressing the issue of monopoly and building a Canadian economy where markets work for the people who depend on them.

Bill C-34 Recommendations

Expert Interview Series: Rob Csernyik

Canadian Anti-Monopoly Project · Expert Interview Series

A Losing Hand: The Human Costs of Canada’s Gambling Epidemic

Welcome to the Canadian Anti-Monopoly Project’s Expert Interview Series, where we speak with researchers, journalists, advocates and other experts about how concentration, market power and competition show up across different industries, and what those dynamics mean for Canadians.

For this edition, we sat down with investigative journalist Rob Csernyik, whose reporting on the economic and social consequences of gambling has been recognized by the Atlantic Journalism Awards, Digital Publishing Awards and RTDNA Canada. In 2022, he received a Michener-Deacon Fellowship for Investigative Reporting to investigate gambling-related suicides in Canada.

His new book, A Losing Hand: The Human Costs of Canada’s Gambling Epidemic, published by Sutherland House in August 2026, examines the expansion of gambling in Canada, from casinos and video lottery terminals to sports betting and online gaming, and the gaps in how governments track and respond to its social and economic harms.

We spoke with Rob about what Canadians misunderstand about the gambling industry, what competition looks like in the rapidly expanding iGaming market, what happens when gambling becomes available at any time from a smartphone, and what Canada can learn from other countries.

Buy the book

The conversation below has been edited for length and clarity.

When did you realize this was a bigger story about Canada’s approach to gambling, rather than a local or regional story about Nova Scotia?

I think that started when I was going through old newspaper archives. One of my central resources for the story was looking for statistics, key dates, who were the players, and using that as the launchpad to find other resources to build out my investigation into the economic and social effects of the casinos in Nova Scotia.

I was using a database of Atlantic Canadian newspapers. It was certainly clear that some of the same issues that were happening in Nova Scotia were also happening elsewhere, but one of the biggest for me was the suicides.

Gambling-related suicides started to pop up quite frequently in my research during the first few years after casinos and video lottery terminals were established in the country.

I found it strange that that topic was not in the public consciousness in Canada, and I wasn't seeing a lot of recent stories about it. It struck me as interesting that in 2003, it was deemed to be such a crisis that coroners and medical examiners said, "We're going to change the way we track this information."

I thought to myself there should be about two decades of very clear, well-tracked information. And there wasn't.

There was also contemporary evidence from news reports that suggested that, even within the first few years, some of that ambition to keep better track and to understand these deaths better just never happened. I also found it very moving on a personal level because the stories were really tragic, and they were so clearly associated with that expansion of gambling. I think it's safe to say that for most people who have died from a gambling-related suicide, they would not have necessarily found their way to gambling if it wasn't so conveniently offered to them.

What do Canadians misunderstand about how gambling works in this country?

Probably the biggest misunderstanding is that people don't necessarily consider that when the government takes an ownership role and a leadership role as a gambling operator, they are also the ones who are responsible for potentially impacted areas like public healthcare, addiction services and emergency room funding.

They're also the ones who may potentially have to deal with other spillovers related to everything from crime to family breakdown to bankruptcies.

It's challenging because we don't have a clear way of ascribing some of these costs and consequences of the gambling industry in a clear and direct financial way.

People also forget about the role of multiplier effects. When I spoke with a tourism industry executive in Nova Scotia, she talked about how, in the tourism industry, a dollar can turn into multiple dollars because there's a multiplier effect when you're spending at local businesses that develops the local economy. But money that is bet through legalized gambling is not going back to the economy in the same way. There is a lack of productivity and economic spinoff that you might see if that spending was deployed differently.

The new push for iGaming industries is often based on converting people gambling in grey markets and black markets. A grey market site is unregulated, while a black market site is unregulated but also criminally associated. The whole idea is if people are doing that, moving players over to the provincially regulated market allows governments to enforce a level of player protections, but more critically for them, they also keep part of the revenues.

The challenge with that is that you're never going to get 100 per cent of those players to move. Some of those people are going to be money laundering, or are going to be youth who are under the age of majority.

There's a lot of discussion based around the "channelization" of players from unregulated to regulated sites. The numbers are really big, but I've noticed that the figures which project how many people are gambling in non-regulated markets vary depending on whether it's a provincial agency, an academic researcher or a gambling consulting company calculating them. I've seen very, very different numbers, which says to me that nobody clearly understands the size of the problem.

We also don't factor for multiple accounts. Traditionally, if you have a government-owned online casino, you're allowed one account. But when you go and open accounts in an iGaming market like Ontario, you could open 20 or 30 different accounts.

In turn, the channelization rate is arguably a lot lower than people expect when these issues are considered.

Ontario’s iGaming market has many competing operators. What does competition actually look like between those companies, and is that competition beneficial or harmful?

Some industry analysts are of the opinion that there's a few companies that really dominate the market, for example FanDuel and DraftKings, with market shares so large that they create a misperception. It looks like there's a wide market, but so few companies are dominant that others aren't necessarily going to have a viable business. You have seen iGaming companies in Ontario already shut down and pull out of the market.

To me, the big question is: what is the market share? New York State, for example, offers weekly and monthly financial reports for each regulated sports betting company which help us understand statistics on market share. That was featured in a Globe and Mail commentary once, which noted that Ontarians had less understanding of this area than their American neighbours.

I think that's a question that should really be asked, because there's a contingent of the population who is going to say personal choice is important and having as many options as possible is important. But there's also a point at which there's diminishing returns.

Maybe having a dozen iGaming operators in Ontario instead of nearly 50 would provide a sufficient amount of choice and opportunities for people to play in that market. It also might reduce that glut of advertising that we see.

One researcher told me that he's of the opinion that sometimes companies enter iGaming markets with the expectation of making money and getting out. If they have to break some rules to do that, or pay some fines along the way, that's okay.

I think that's something worth considering. When you have that huge market and you have all these operators, surely there's going to be some who, in that quest to attract customers, are willing to, if not play a bit loosely with the rules, perhaps just take the financial penalty to avoid them if at all possible.

What changes when the distance someone has to travel to gamble effectively falls to zero?

I think it's really important to think about the portion of Canada that lives in rural settings. I once spoke with a gambler in recovery who said she used to physically have to take a ferry to a casino because she lived on an island. This created friction each time she wanted to gamble. Now, a gambler can take out their cell phone any time of day and play.

What we maybe forget is that the ability to play was always tempered with certain frictions. VLTs don’t operate 24 hours a day. There are betting limits on them in Atlantic Canada, whereas you can go on Atlantic Lotto’s regulated online gambling site and play 24 hours a day. You could bet, in some cases, hundreds of times as much on these online slots.

We're in an age where it's convenient to have everything in the palm of your hand, but there was a certain protection in having gambling in physical spaces with certain regulations around them. We're losing that in this new wave of legalized gambling.

It's also worth noting that, especially in iGaming provinces like Ontario and Alberta, partner sites are run by independent operators. They have a different focus than a government does. They have different relationships with profit and shareholders, and those factors into their decisions.

I once heard an employee who worked for one of the bigger casino companies in the U.S. say that no company is ever going to do more than the bare minimum of player protection set out by a government because there's no financial incentive. If they add frictions that their competitors don't have, that puts them on the losing side of a business equation.

Realistically, when a government decides to expand gambling and to invite in private enterprise, they need to consider this fact when building policies. So far in Ontario and Alberta, those have not been central to the discussion.

What can Canada learn from countries that have gone further in studying or regulating gambling harms?

First, I'll talk about the UK and gambling-related suicides. Those have really been brought to the forefront by families who have lost loved ones to suicides where gambling was a risk factor. There have been several inquests in the last few years in the UK into gambling-related suicides. The inquest process is when you investigate a death to learn more about the factors surrounding it and try to figure out if there are ways to protect the wider public and prevent future deaths. In some cases, those have led to asking companies: what can you do to improve player protections in light of what we're seeing?

The UK government now has a formal estimate of how many residents die by a gambling-related suicide. That's a conversation we could have in Canada, but what that requires is coroners and medical examiners asking more questions to make sure it's recognized if a death is gambling-related. It also requires families to advocate for that. I don't think families should have to be the ones pushing for it, but when we take a less stigmatizing approach to gambling and make it a more open conversation, that allows people who've been impacted, whether individually or as an affected other, to speak out about their experience.

If you look at Australia, one of the most notable things is they have considerable research. My reporting often comes back to Australian researchers and Australian studies. We have some great academic researchers here who are looking into gambling-related harms, but the area is not as well funded or as capitalized upon. As we move forward in this gambling era, we need to fund research to make sure we understand how it is affecting Canadians.

Finally, there are countries where they have data vaults, almost like a cloud program, where a provincial gaming corporation can view anonymous player data and analyze it. Regulators use data vaults to look at everything from suspicious transactions that might indicate money laundering to play patterns which might indicate that a bettor is wagering in a harmful way and might need a level of intervention.

Given the harms you document, why not go further in calling for the industry to be scaled back or dismantled?

I think it comes back to being a realist. If you look at the history of gambling expansion in this country, we have been asking the same sorts of questions, and replying with the same answers: it will create jobs, it will create tourists, it will do X, Y and Z.

When I say that I'm a realist, what I mean is I think it would be very easy to say, "Let's scrap iGaming. Let's cut that down to five companies." But where's the incentive for the government, which is bringing in revenue, to do that? Where is the incentive for the corporations who are making money? Where is the incentive for the swath of people who are going to say, "Well, that affects personal choice?"

Putting the genie back in the bottle is not going to happen. The real question, in my opinion, is what are we going to do moving forward?

Take Alberta. Maybe instead of bringing on as many iGaming partners as Ontario, they can have a moment of clarity and say, "This maybe doesn't make sense with the size of population we have, with the potential for harm."

You have provinces like Quebec and British Columbia where there has been some lobbying for these new iGaming industries. But let's say that's the way things go eventually. I think the question is: how do we right-size it? How do we make sure that it's an industry where there's data vaults, and we have certain frictions or betting limits, et cetera?

To me, that's where the changes have to happen. There's this challenge where some people think that to solve gambling harms, you need to get rid of the baby with the bathwater and extinguish the industry from existence.

As someone who's spoken with people who have lost loved ones to gambling-related suicides, even they have not necessarily called for a wholesale dismantling of the gambling industry. What they have expressed interest in are reforms to make sure that people who are adversely harmed by the industry can avoid the worst consequences of addiction, like suicide.

My reporting led the Newfoundland and Labrador Medical Examiner’s office to finally start tracking gambling as a suicide risk factor, and their office had been created in 1996. I'm going to get that first batch of data 30 years after that major reform for their office and 23 years after there was supposedly a national reckoning that led to better tracking.

Change is slow. It requires taking incremental steps. That's really where we need to focus. Small changes over time are going to make the real difference.

To learn more about Rob’s work, pick up a copy of A Losing Hand: The Human Costs of Canada’s Gambling Epidemic.


CAMP welcomes planned Canada-EU competition agreement, calls for broader regulatory cooperation

October 1, 2026 [Ottawa, ON] – The Canadian Anti-Monopoly Project (CAMP) welcomes plans for a second-generation Canada-EU Competition Agreement, which could strengthen cooperation between the two jurisdictions’ competition authorities and help address anti-competitive conduct across borders. 

A draft joint statement prepared for the October 29–30 Canada-EU Summit says negotiations on the agreement have concluded. It describes the agreement as a way to strengthen cooperation between competition authorities and support a more open, innovative and competitive marketplace for businesses and consumers. 

“Competition problems do not stop at national borders, especially in markets shaped by large multinational companies,” said Keldon Bester, Executive Director of the Canadian Anti-Monopoly Project. “Closer cooperation between Canadian and European authorities could help them respond more effectively to anti-competitive conduct that affects both jurisdictions. The agreement’s value will depend on how that cooperation works in practice.” 

CAMP has called for Canadian regulators to deepen information-sharing and coordination with their European counterparts on competition, privacy, communications and democratic resilience. A stronger competition agreement would advance that work while creating an opportunity to build cooperation across other areas of shared concern. 

The draft statement also proposes regular Canada-EU engagement and early consultation on major policy and regulatory initiatives. That cooperation could help both sides respond to the influence of powerful companies across digital markets and other sectors. 

“An agreement is a useful foundation,” Bester said. “Canada and the EU should use it to coordinate enforcement and build a wider working relationship that helps governments address concentrated market power and its effects on people and businesses.” 


CAMP is a think tank dedicated to addressing the issue of monopoly in Canada. We produce research, policy, and commentary in support of a more free, fair and democratic economy.

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